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Abstract 
Collective interviewing – the interviewing of multiple suspects simultaneously – has been 
neglected within the deception detection literature, yet it has the potential to have theoretical 
and practical implications for professionals involved in citizen security. The current review 
recaps the importance of lie detection and when collective interviewing can be used, before 
summarising the collective interviewing deception studies published to date. The published 
studies show that a lack of interactive and communicative cues, such as posing questions to 
one another, correcting one another, interrupting one another, finishing each other’s 
sentences, and looking at one another, are significant indicators of deceit. The review 
highlights that theories about memory and group dynamics are crucial to understanding the 
deception occurring within groups, and therefore should be the focus of future collective 
interviewing deception studies. Additionally, some comparisons are made between individual 
and collective interviewing with the take home message that collective interviewing should 
not replace individual interviewing, but that both types of interviewing should be used, 
perhaps sometimes in conjunction with one another. 
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A Review of the Collective Interviewing Approach to Detecting Deception in Pairs 
 
Importance of studying deception detection 
An understanding of deception (a deliberate attempt to mislead others; DePaulo et al., 
2003) and its detection is particularly important in criminal, intelligence and security 
investigations, as investigators need appropriate fact-finding interview styles to be able to 
differentiate truth-telling from lying individuals. Accuracy rates for practitioner lie catchers in 
empirical research are generally low, ranging from 45% to 60% (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 
Vrij, 2008a), and such low accuracy rates can be expected given the challenging nature of lie 
detection. For example, cues to deceit are typically subtle, and liars frequently use 
countermeasures to appear credible. Also, professional lie catchers make common errors such 
as examining the wrong cues or placing too much emphasis on nonverbal cues (see Vrij, 
Granhag & Porter, 2010 for a review of the challenges and errors associated with detecting 
deceit).  
Through realising that cues are subtle, researchers started to develop interview 
protocols that can assist professionals with the aim of eliciting and magnifying the verbal and 
nonverbal cues to deception by focussing on the different psychological mental states of truth-
tellers and liars (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). The two most extensively examined approaches to 
date are the ‘Strategic Use of Evidence’ (SUE) technique and the cognitive lie detection 
approach (see Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Hartwig, Granhag & Luke, 2014; Vrij, 2015; Vrij, 
Fisher, Blank, Leal & Mann, in press; Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham & Brankaert, 2015, for 
overviews of this research). In this article, we review one of these new interviewing protocols 
belonging to the cognitive lie detection approach: Collective interviewing, which is the 
interviewing of multiple suspects simultaneously.  
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Collective interviewing 
Deception detection research has primarily focused on the interviewing of single 
suspects despite the fact that crimes, or other forms of wrongdoings, are frequently committed 
by multiple individuals (McGloin & Piquero, 2009; Soufan, 2011; Van Mastrigt & Farrington, 
2009). For example, police detectives typically separate suspects as soon as possible prior to 
interrogation to reduce opportunity for planning of responses, and to increase the suspects’ 
stress and anxiety (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). To reflect this practice, in the few studies 
that have considered groups of truth-tellers and groups of liars (always pairs), the group 
members were interviewed individually (e.g. Granhag, Strömwall & Jonsson, 2003; 
Strömwall, Granhag & Jonsson, 2003; Vrij et al., 2009). Consequently, investigators are 
required to manage numerous statements from several suspects at any one time.  
When lie catchers have access to numerous statements, they tend to focus on verbal 
consistency between these statements (Strömwall et al., 2003). Although verbal cues are more 
diagnostic of deceit than nonverbal cues (Vrij, 2008b), research has identified that purely 
comparing verbal statements from multiple individuals in a group, in terms of consistency, is 
not effective. Statements from lying groups, although more vague, appear as consistent as 
statements from truth-telling groups because liars plan and rehearse a cover-story and stick to 
that rehearsed story (Granhag et al., 2003; Strömwall et al., 2003; Vrij, Mann, Leal & 
Granhag, 2010). In contrast, truth-tellers do not pre-plan their responses and instead rely on 
memory which is inherently reconstructive in nature (Bartlett, 1932; Granhag & Strömwall, 
1999). Their statements may in fact be less consistent than those obtained from liars due to 
memory distortions such as omission errors (the leaving out of information) and commission 
errors (the adding in of information). Hence, it is clear that lie catchers need to be cautious 
when interviewing multiple suspects individually and interpreting consistent statements as 
truthful and inconsistent statements as mendacious. 
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There are several field settings in which collective interviewing would be more suited 
than interviewing individuals separately, for example, during police stop and searches, at road 
border controls where cars containing several people are checked, at security checkpoints 
(e.g., airports), during immigration interviews, or during house to house enquiries. These 
settings often tend to be intelligence-gathering or security contexts where the focus is on 
preventing actions that may cause harm, rather than catching groups of individuals who have 
already caused harm. In such settings, it would be more timely and convenient to interview 
the group members simultaneously, particularly if there is only one interviewer available.  
Although collective interviewing is a new line of research within the deception 
detection literature, it is already used in practice. For example, in the UK, immigration 
officers use collective interviewing at one potential stage, when attempting to uncover sham 
marriages (marriages of convenience whereby the marriage is not genuine; Home Office, 
2013). Also in the UK, police detectives question people in groups when making house to 
house enquiries. In Canada, customs officers carry out collective interviews at airports 
because groups are deemed to have ‘similar issues’; thus if only one person in the group is 
examined, this could result in a wasted effort or a missed opportunity (A. Leach, Canadian 
former customs officer, personal communication, November 12th 2013).  
Collective interviewing provides a different insight into deception compared with 
interviewing individuals separately. Collective interviewing will determine deception at an 
individual level as well as at a social level, and the latter enables new cues to deceit to be 
identified from the group that cannot be explored in individuals, e.g., cues stemming from 
individuals communicating and interacting with one another. Consequently, the approach will 
enable new interview techniques to be explored that allows for deception detection when two 
or more individuals are interviewed together about the same event. Additionally, group 
interviewing compliments memory research, which focuses on collaborative learning and 
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remembering, as well as research into group processes, which focuses on group formation and 
leadership. Hence, a collective approach allows for alternative theories and concepts to be 
applied to deception that cannot be applied when interviewing only individuals, such as 
transactive memory (Wegner, 1987), collective memory (Barnier & Sutton, 2008), dominance 
(Rogers-Millar & Millar, 1979), and group dynamics (Arrow, McGrath & Berdahl, 2000). To 
date, all collective interviewing deception studies have been based on memory theory, with 
none of them considering group dynamics. We therefore discuss the group dynamics literature 
relevant for collective interviewing in the ‘future research’ section. 
Theoretical underpinnings behind a collective approach: Memory processes  
It is widely acknowledged that memory plays an important role in deception (Sporer 
& Schwandt, 2006; Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar & Meijer, 2011; Walczyk, Igou, Dixon & 
Tcholakian, 2013), and that the act of remembering is, at least in part, influenced by social 
dynamics (Halbwachs, 1992; Hirst & Rajaram, 2014). Previously, memory literature has 
focused on individual memory, ignoring the significance of collective memory whereby 
groups of individuals share, remember, and recall memories together (also referred to as 
social memory or collaborative remembering). However, the benefits of collective memory 
are now being emphasised. For example, Pociask and Rajaram (2014) found that participants 
were more likely to solve assigned problems associated with material they had studied if they 
were working collaboratively compared to individually. Additionally, there are three 
cognitive processes that aid collaborative recall: Re-exposure (hearing another group member 
recall information that they themselves had forgotten), cross-cueing (hearing another group 
member recall information that reminds them of additional information), and error-pruning 
(where feedback from other members of the group create discussions that make people realise 
their recall errors) (Blumen and Stern, 2011; Rajaram, 2011; Ross, Blatz & Schryer, 2008). 
These cognitive processes cannot occur when recall occurs individually.  
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Collective interviewing coincides with this memory research which is increasingly 
focusing on collective memory and collaborative recall. Given that research suggests that 
group collaboration can aid memory through re-exposure, cross-cueing, and error-pruning, it 
is not surprising that deception studies using collective interviewing have found that 
communicative and interactive cues between group members occur more frequently in truth-
tellers who are actually recalling a joint experienced event compared to liars who are 
fabricating an event (e.g., Driskell, Salas & Driskell, 2012; Vernham, Vrij, Leal, Mann & 
Hillman, 2014; Vrij et al., 2012). As our understanding of collective memory improves so will 
our understanding of how groups recall information together when being truthful. That is, if 
more is known about how truthful group members share and recall information together, more 
can be learnt about how they differ from group members who are fabricating shared events 
and attempting to deceive the recipient(s). Consequently, investigators can employ specific 
interview strategies that aid the remembering of truth-tellers but disrupt the recall of 
information from liars.  
The theory of Transactive Memory is concerned with how groups (and individuals) 
process and structure information with regard to past events. The theory postulates that people 
who are in a close relationship share remembering (e.g., through discussing the event to reach 
a shared understanding of that event) and know each other’s memory expertise (i.e. each 
person knows what s/he is to remember as well as what the other person in the pair is to 
remember; Hollingshead & Brandon, 2003). This leads to a transactive memory system – 
referring to the interactions occurring within the individuals of the group and the processes 
developed to update shared memories – that is greater than the total of both the individual 
memories (Wegner, 1987; Wegner, Erber & Raymond, 1991; Wegner, Giuliano & Hertel, 
1985).  
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A transactive memory system is active at all three stages of memory formation and 
recall; (1) when information is encoded regarding a shared experience, responsibility for 
remembering the information is divided and shared between the members of the pair (e.g., 
through instructions, such as “Zagor, remember this phone number”, or through negotiation, 
such as “Don’t you think you are better at remembering this sort of information than I am?”) 
(Hollingshead & Brandon, 2003); (2) when information is stored, each individual within the 
pair has remembering responsibilities, knowing what their role is, what they are to remember, 
and what information their partner has access to (e.g., if you know your partner is good at 
remembering everything about cars, then you know you can ask him/her anything about the 
cars you rented whilst on your holidays abroad together) (Wegner et al., 1991); and (3) 
retrieval of information is social and interactive as the individuals within the pair 
communicate considerably with one another to retrieve as much information as possible (e.g., 
by posing questions to one another). Hollingshead (1998) refers to the transaction memory 
search whereby group members who have actually experienced a past shared event make 
automatic use of their transactive memory system to increase recall. Their communication 
with one another and the discussion of incoming information enhances their individual 
recollections. Hence, it is during this retrieval stage that deception researchers can measure 
communicative and interactive cues indicative of those that are telling the truth (e.g., posing 
questions to one another, reminding one another of further details, correcting each other, and 
adding information to each other’s accounts) (Driskell et al., 2012; Jundi, Vrij, Hope, Mann & 
Hillman, 2013; Vernham, Vrij, Leal et al., 2014; Vrij et al., 2012). 
Pairs or groups of individuals who are (partially) inventing shared events will need to 
deceive investigators. For lying groups to be able to do this, they need to illustrate the same 
pattern of responses as the truth-telling groups. This will be difficult to do without a shared 
memory system for encoding, storing and retrieving information. Indeed, deceptive 
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communication is characterised by the absence of social and interactive behaviours (Driskell 
et al., 2012; Jundi, Vrij, Hope et al., 2013; Jundi, Vrij, Mann et al., 2013; Vernham, Vrij, Leal 
et al., 2014). Instead, lying pairs rely on their individual processes, which means that each 
member needs to rely on their individual cognitive ability to create a story that makes sense 
and matches with what the other individual in their pair has said (Hintz, 1990). Consequently, 
they exhibit fewer interactions (Driskell et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2012), and, due to the 
misconceptions held by people with regard to which cues imply deceit, they will actually 
avoid behaviours displayed by truth-tellers, such as correcting and interrupting one another 
and posing questions to one another, through fear that these behaviours will make them 
appear guilty (Vrij, 2008a). Truth-tellers will not avoid such behaviours because they believe 
the truth will shine through (‘illusion of transparency’; Gilovich, Savitsky & Medvec, 1998). 
To summarise, two people recalling a jointly experienced event will do so in a 
different manner than two people who are attempting to recall a fabricated event. 
Consequently, an understanding of the ways in which groups recall shared events together is 
vital to enhancing our understanding of joint memory recall and subsequently group deceit. 
That is, not only should the focus be on the information that is reported, but also on how 
group members interact with each other when reporting that information.  
Collective interviewing studies: What do we know so far? 
To date, seven studies have been published that have applied a collective interviewing 
approach to the detection of deception (see Table 1 for an overview of these studies and 
findings). These studies examined deception in different contexts (see Table 1) and examined 
different verbal and nonverbal communication cues (see Table 1). In one study, a novel 
interview procedure was introduced – forced turn-taking – and when this was implemented, 
liars found it more challenging to cope with than truth-tellers.  
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Driskell et al. (2012) used 26 pairs of police officers or fire-fighters who knew each 
other well because they had previously worked together as partners in real life. Pairs of truth-
tellers were asked to describe a recent event that they had jointly participated in. Pairs of liars 
were instructed to fabricate a story that did not actually take place, but that involved them 
doing something together. All participants had a moment to decide what event they would 
discuss. The theory of transactive memory was applied and it was found that pairs of truth-
tellers illustrated more synchrony in social behaviours (i.e. co-occurrence of behaviours, e.g., 
mutual eye gaze) and exhibited more interactions (e.g., verbal transitions whereby one 
person’s speech immediately follows the other person’s speech) than pairs of liars. This study 
used real-life events that were relevant to the pairs of participants; hence increasing ecological 
validity. However, in this study, ground truth could not be established, which makes it 
difficult to measure whether the liars definitely lied and the truth-tellers definitely told the 
truth. 
In Vrij et al. (2012), 21 pairs of truth-tellers went out for lunch in a nearby restaurant, 
whereas 22 pairs of liars were asked to steal £10 from an office. On returning to the 
laboratory, truth-tellers were informed about the stolen money and told that they were going 
to be interviewed about their whereabouts at the time the money was taken, and that they 
should tell the truth about their time in the restaurant. In contrast, liars were told that they 
were going to be interviewed about their activities but that they were not to admit to having 
taken the money. Instead, they were instructed to prepare an alibi about having gone to a 
nearby restaurant together for lunch. All pairs were given as much time as they needed to 
prepare for the interview and were not informed that they would be interviewed together. It 
was found that pairs of truth-tellers interrupted and corrected each other more than pairs of 
liars, as well as adding more information to each other’s accounts in comparison to pairs of 
liars.  
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Jundi, Vrij, Mann, et al. (2013) used Vrij et al.’s (2012) data-set, but examined 
participants’ eye contact. They found that pairs of liars tended to make more eye contact with 
the interviewer than pairs of truth-tellers, whereas pairs of truth-tellers looked more at each 
other than pairs of liars. The studies by Vrij et al. (2012) and Jundi, Vrij, Mann, et al. (2013) 
used artificial tasks in which ground truth was established. However, there was a lack of 
ecological validity.  
In Jundi, Vrij, Hope et al. (2013), 24 pairs of truth-tellers completed a mission 
whereby they undertook a ‘Visit a Park’ campaign, whilst 23 pairs of liars completed a 
mission whereby they undertook an ‘Animal Rights’ campaign. The task for all pairs was to 
convince an interviewer that they had completed the ‘Visit a Park’ campaign. All pairs were 
given as much time as they required to prepare for the interview and were not informed 
whether they would be interviewed separately or together. In the interview, the pairs were 
asked to illustrate on a timeline how long each aspect of their campaign had taken. They were 
instructed to work together to indicate exactly what they had done and at what times. It was 
found that, compared to lying pairs, truth-telling pairs posed more questions to one another 
whilst completing the timeline task, which provides support for the theory of transactive 
memory. The authors demonstrated that 71% of truth-tellers and 87% of liars could be 
classified correctly on the basis of this task. However, these accuracy rates need to be 
interpreted with caution because they were based on group means rather than on pre-
determined cut-off points. This means that the number of questions that need to be posed for 
each individual pair to be classified as a truth-telling pair cannot be predicted and determined 
on the basis of this study. In real-life, investigators would need this information.  
In Vernham, Vrij, Mann, Leal and Hillman (2014), 24 real (truth-telling) and 22 
pretend (lying) couples were interviewed in their pairs with the task of convincing an 
interviewer that they were a bona fide couple. Truth-telling couples were actually in a 
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relationship for at least one year and were now living together. Lying couples were friends 
who had never been in a relationship or lived together. The study implemented a forced turn-
taking technique as a way of imposing cognitive load (see Vrij, Fisher, Mann & Leal, 2006; 
Vrij, Granhag, Mann & Leal, 2011; Vrij et al., 2008 for articles on the benefits of imposing 
cognitive load to detect deceit). The turn-taking technique involves the interviewer stating 
which of the two interviewees is to answer the question and then intervening every 20 
seconds by stopping whichever of the interviewees is responding and asking the other 
interviewee in the pair to continue from the point at which their partner was stopped. It was 
found that when forced turn-taking was employed, truth-telling pairs were significantly more 
able to continue on from one another, whereas lying pairs were significantly more likely to 
wait and repeat what their partner last said before continuing. In a subsequent lie detection 
study laypersons were informed about these three turn-taking cues (continuations, repetitions, 
waiting), and it improved their ability to accurately detect deceit considerably (accuracy rates 
ranged from 79%-92% for truth-tellers and 73%-86% for liars across all three variables when 
observers who read the transcripts of these interviews were asked to pay attention to these 
cues). These accuracy rates obtained are amongst the highest obtained in verbal lie detection 
research.  
Vernham, Vrij, Leal et al. (2014) used the same data-set as Vernham, Vrij, Mann et al. 
(2014), but examined how couples share cognition and ‘think together’ when discussing their 
relationship, a previous memorable day they had together, and a recent holiday they went on 
together. Therefore, the variables measured in this study aimed to reflect the fact that truth-
telling couples should have a transactive memory system, whereas lying couples should not. 
The main findings were that truth-telling couples posed questions to one another, provided 
cues to one another (e.g., one pair member saying; “We watched something but I can’t 
remember the name of it now”, and the other pair member responding with;  “The thing we 
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were watching was a soap called Chalkhill Lives”, which results in the first pair member 
replying; “Oh yeah, I remember now”), handed over remembering responsibility (e.g., one 
pair member saying to their partner; “You remember this better than me, why don’t you 
explain it”) and finished each other’s sentences significantly more than lying pairs. Finishing 
each other’s sentences in particular was a diagnostic cue to veracity with 83% of truth-tellers 
and 91% of liars being correctly classified based on the group means. Support was obtained 
for the theory of transactive memory.  
The studies by Vernham, Vrij, Mann et al. (2014) and Vernham, Vrij, Leal et al. 
(2014) show the potential of a collective interviewing approach in the detection of sham 
marriages and illegal immigration, which is high up on the political agenda in various 
countries. However, it is important to acknowledge that truth-telling pairs always told a story 
about their real romantic relationship, whereas lying pairs always told a false story about a 
fictitious romantic relationship. This means that not only did veracity differ between the two 
conditions, but so did relationship status. Consequently, it could be argued that the findings 
obtained were due to truth-telling pairs having more experience of communicating shared 
events with one another than the lying pairs. However, the relationship length of the truth-
telling pairs and the friendship length and closeness of the lying pairs were not associated 
with the occurrence of any of the dependent variables. Hence, it would seem that it was 
veracity that influenced the emergence of each of the cues (see Table 1).  
Finally, in Nahari and Vrij (2014), 25 truth-telling pairs completed non-criminal 
activities together, whereas 25 lying pairs were separated so that one liar did the non-criminal 
activities alone and the other liar completed a criminal task alone. All pairs then had to 
convince an investigator that they had both completed the non-criminal activities together by 
typing up a collective statement. The verifiability approach (Nahari, Vrij & Fisher, 2014) to 
lie detection was applied and it was found that truth-telling pairs, in comparison to lying pairs, 
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provided significantly more details that could be verified to demonstrate they had completed 
activities together (e.g., “We went in the central library and asked a librarian where we could 
find the book we wanted”). Based on group means regarding this cue, 80% of truth-tellers and 
96% of liars could be correctly classified. Whilst the verifiability approach has been shown to 
significantly differentiate truth-tellers from liars, this approach cannot be applied to historical 
cases or cases whereby innocent people cannot provide verifiable details. Nevertheless, the 
latter is increasingly unlikely to be an issue because nowadays a person’s location can be 
traced by their mobile phone, social networking accounts, etc.  
It is important to note that all seven collective interviewing studies conducted to date 
have involved dyads. However, research into collective interviewing is still in the very early 
stages and therefore smaller groups (i.e. pairs) are a good starting point for demonstrating the 
benefit of a collective approach in the detection of deception. Additionally, the most common 
number of individuals involved in a co-offending group has been found to be two (Hodgson 
& Costello, 2006), and therefore an understanding of the deceit occurring within pairs and 
how to detect it is particularly applicable to the real world. Nevertheless, future studies should 
consider the effects of interviewing larger groups collectively on the emergence of cues to 
deceit. 
To summarise, despite the minor procedural issues with each of the collective 
interviewing studies, they do all demonstrate the clear potential for using collective 
interviewing to detect deceit. The cues found to distinguish truth-tellers from liars (see Table 
1) cannot be measured when individuals are interviewed separately. All the collective 
interviewing studies conducted support collective memory and the notion that collaboration 
can aid recall. Consequently, there is the potential for collective interviewing to actually 
enhance memory recall from truth-telling groups, but not from lying groups.  
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Individual vs. Collective interviewing 
To date, no study that has explored collective interviewing has implemented an 
individual interviewing condition (i.e. interviewing group members separately) as a 
comparison group, so the merits of a collective approach compared to an individual approach 
are unknown. However, what is clear from the studies conducted so far is that collective 
interviewing has considerable potential. First, unlike individual interviewing which can only 
focus on the individual indicators of deceit, collective interviewing can explore individual and 
social indicators of deceit. In other words, collective interviewing can focus on more cues 
than individual interviewing which means that, potentially, more cues to deceit could emerge. 
Second, when members of groups are interviewed separately, cues to deceit only emerge 
when unanticipated interview questions are asked during the interview because this negates 
any pre-planning of what to say during the interview (Vrij et al., 2009). When interviewing 
collectively, however, cues to deceit emerge from both anticipated and unanticipated 
interview questions (e.g. Vernham, Vrij, Leal, et al., 2014) because the focus is not on what is 
being said but on how the group members are communicating and interacting with one 
another. Third, a collective interviewing approach has strong theoretical support, ranging 
from cognitive (memory) to social (group) theory. If our knowledge about what is going on in 
the minds of truthful and deceptive individuals during collective interviews increases, then 
there is more possibility that researchers will be able to design interventions that exploit these 
different mind-sets of truth-tellers and liars, which may elicit new, or enhance existing, cues 
to deceit (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). Finally, in some contexts, such as immigration interviews 
or alibi witness scenarios, it would be more timely and convenient to interview group 
members together at the same time.  
Despite the clear potential of collective interviewing, there are also some limitations, 
especially when we consider memory and the effects of recalling information together. For 
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example, human memory is susceptible to misinformation from a variety of sources, 
particularly other people (Loftus, 2005) and consequently collective interviewing may lead to 
memory contamination whereby one group member causes other group members to remember 
information incorrectly (Gabbert, Memon & Allan, 2003). Additionally, whilst studies tend to 
show that collaborative groups (group members recalling information together) recall 
significantly more information than individuals (each group member recalling information 
alone), the studies show that nominal groups (pooled individuals whereby the group members 
recall information individually, but details are summed so that any duplicate details are 
removed) recall significantly more information than collaborative groups due to collaborative 
inhibition (the effect that occurs when a group of people working together remember and 
recall more than any one individual but recall less than their predicted potential) (Basden, 
Basden, Bryner & Thomas, 1997, Weldon & Bellinger, 1997). This collaborative inhibition is 
believed to be a result of retrieval disruption (e.g., each individuals’ organisation of the 
material is interrupted by the way the other group members recall the information) and 
retrieval inhibition (e.g., other peoples non-cue words supress memory representations 
making them unavailable to retrieve) (Barber, Harris & Rajaram, 2014). Although this 
collaborative inhibition needs to be considered when interviewing collectively, it is important 
to remember that group collaboration can also aid memory and therefore diminish any effects 
of collaborative inhibition (e.g., re-exposure, cross-cueing, and error-pruning).  
Although it would seem that an understanding of group deceit through collective 
interviewing has benefits for practice, it is important to note that we do not think that 
collective interviewing should replace individual interviewing. Instead, we think that 
collective interviewing can be employed as an additional approach to individual interviewing. 
For example, the collective interview could be used in isolation whereby if the group raises 
suspicion in a collective interview, investigators could take the required actions they would 
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normally take after interviewing individuals who raise suspicion (e.g., calling for assistance, 
collecting further evidence). Moreover, collective interviewing could act as an initial 
screening process to determine whether suspects then need to be interviewed individually. 
The opposite route could also be employed: If individual interviews with group members 
raise suspicion, they then could be interviewed collectively. Future research should determine 
not only when a combination of individual and collective interviewing is desirable, but should 
also examine the most efficient sequence in which collective and individual interviewing 
should be conducted (i.e. should the collective interview or the individual interview be 
conducted first? Or is this dependent on the context in which it is being applied?).  
Future research into collective interviewing: Group dynamics 
There are a number of promising future research opportunities within the area of 
collective interviewing to detect deceit. For this, it is important to discuss the theory behind 
group dynamics and how this could aid the understanding of how to detect deceit within 
groups. When applying a collective approach to the detection of deception, the group 
dynamics and how each of the group members bond and work together (labelled group 
formation; Arrow et al., 2000) are imperative for the group to succeed. Groups often form a 
structure with each member having a different role and being of a different status. Roles 
facilitate group functioning, and when these roles are inflexible or clouded, this can be 
detrimental to the group (Gersick & Hackman, 1990). As discussed previously, detecting 
deception studies that have involved interviewing groups together demonstrate the importance 
of interaction and communication cues. Group roles influence how group members behave 
and communicate with one another; thus these roles are likely to influence the interaction and 
communication cues that arise from within that group.  
Group roles are not equal and therefore individuals of a higher status (i.e. leaders who 
are deemed to be more knowledgeable and able to initiate the ideas and activities adopted by 
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the group) will be more valued and respected than individuals who are of a lower or equal 
status (Chemers, 2001; Hollander, 1985). For example, individuals are typically reluctant to 
express disagreement with their group leaders in a group discussion, but are more willing to 
express disagreement with those group members who are not superior to themselves 
(Chemers, 2001; Hollander, 1985). In group discussions this could result in a systematic 
pattern of agreeing and disagreeing with fellow group members. If this is then examined 
within a collective interviewing context to detect deceit, ‘agreement’ and ‘disagreement’ 
could be measured as a function of the role or status within the group. As was previously 
mentioned in the memory processes section, lying group members tend to disagree less with 
each other, than truth-telling group members, as they believe that disagreements will come 
across as suspicious. It is therefore expected that low status individuals within a truth-telling 
group and low status individuals within a lying group will not differ from one another as both 
will tend to agree with the other group members. However, they will do this for different 
reasons: Liars will not disagree because they think this will put them under suspicion, 
whereas truth-tellers know their role within the group so will not disagree with higher status 
group members. Conversely, it is expected that high status truth-tellers and high status liars 
will differ from one another. That is, high status individuals within a truth-telling group will 
not be scared to disagree with other group members, whereas high status individuals within a 
lying group will not disagree with other group members through fear that this will look 
suspicious. Consequently, communication cues in the form of agreements and disagreements 
should theoretically differ depending on the veracity of the group when group members differ 
in status.  
Aside from group status, the degree of dependence upon a group could potentially 
influence the outcomes. For example, individualistic cultures, such as Australia, New 
Zealand, Western Europe and the USA, are independent cultures with self-reliance being 
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greatly emphasised. Individuals of such cultures focus on identifying more with the self so 
that their own needs are satisfied before those of the group. Conversely, collectivistic cultures, 
such as India, Japan and Korea, are interdependent cultures so that the well-being of each 
individual is related to the success of the group. Emphasis is put on group loyalty and 
conformity, with the self-identity of each individual developing from the relationships and 
interconnectedness between all group members (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Hui, 1988).  
Participants in the collective interviewing studies mentioned in this review are 
primarily from the UK and USA, therefore of an individualistic culture. Someone could argue 
that findings from collective interviewing studies in a collectivistic culture may be stronger in 
terms of  the behaviours they show for protecting the group because supporting the group is 
more important in such cultures, and therefore the focus of all groups members will be on 
preventing any lies from being unveiled. Thus, the communicative and interactive cues to 
deceit that emerge from groups supporting collectivism may be more prevalent and detectable 
compared to the communicative and interactive cues shown to be indicative of deceit in 
groups supporting individualism.  
Another concept to consider is group cohesiveness, which explores the properties of a 
group that effectively bind them together to give the group a sense of solidarity (Festinger, 
1950). One way of exploring this notion of cohesiveness during collective interviewing is to 
consider what would happen to the cohesiveness of the group if a group member “slips up” 
during the interview. One would expect there to be a veracity effect because if the group are 
concealing information, then the rest of the group may perceive this individual as behaving 
differently to the rest and not satisfying the group goals or standards. The group may see this 
as a threat to cohesiveness and therefore a threat to their group’s credibility. Subsequently, 
they may respond in a way that restores the group cohesiveness. For example, they may start 
to support the individual who slipped up, or find a way of explaining the information that this 
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individual has provided. In that way, the group restores solidarity and motivates all group 
members, including the individual who slipped up, to act on behalf of the group. This type of 
response may not arise in a group whose members are not concealing information, because 
non-concealing group members are likely to be less concerned about their group cohesiveness 
during the interview and may be more willing to correct or disagree with other group 
members. 
To summarise, psychological theories associated with group dynamics have not yet 
been applied to deception and deception detection, therefore we can only speculate about the 
effect of group dynamics on cues to deceit. However, we believe that group dynamics can be 
important in understanding communication in collective interviewing and may result in the 
elicitation of cues to deceit. Future collective interviewing studies should not only explore 
deception detection in terms of memory or group dynamics, but should also consider a 
combination of them both. A clearer understanding of memory and the social processes 
surrounding groups could enable the identification of diagnostic cues to deceit that emerge 
when two or more interviewees are interviewed simultaneously, and could aid in the 
development of interview protocols that elicit or enhance such cues. 
Additional future research ideas into collective interviewing 
In the previous section about group dynamics we mentioned numerous ideas for future 
research. We believe that more important studies are required to get a more complete picture 
of collective interviewing in relation to deception which fall outside the group dynamics 
domain. These ideas are discussed in this section. First, future studies should consider 
alternative contexts or scenarios in which collective interviewing could be applied, for 
example, insurance claims (e.g., couples making a fire insurance claim on their house), the 
use of an informant (e.g., police putting an informant within a group to secretly gather 
information), security equipment (e.g., using CCTV to spot interactive behaviours between 
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group members indicative of those with malicious intent), and house to house enquiries (e.g., 
interviewing whole families together about a nearby crime that they may or may not have 
witnessed). The more contexts which demonstrate how collective interviewing can succeed in 
differentiating liars from truth-tellers, the more law enforcement and other agencies will 
believe in its utility and practical value.  
Second, the collective interviewing studies conducted so far differed in that in some 
studies the pairs were informed that they were going to be interviewed collectively (e.g., 
Vernham, Vrij, Mann et al., 2014), whereas this was not the case in other studies (e.g., Vrij et 
al., 2012). In future experiments, it could be manipulated whether or not group members are 
informed of how they will be interviewed. We expect that informing groups of liars that they 
will be interviewed collectively will make them develop individual deceptive strategies that 
focus on the fabricated story and on how they should behave in order to appear convincing 
(e.g., sitting still, avoiding stuttering). It is interesting to examine whether it will occur to 
them to discuss how they should communicate and interact with each other (e.g., adding 
information to each other’s stories, looking at one another), and whether they could do this in 
such a way that they appear as truth-tellers. Since the collective interviewing studies in which 
group members knew they were going to be interviewed together (e.g., Vernham, Vrij, Mann, 
et al., 2014) resulted in similar cues to deceit as those obtained in other collective 
interviewing studies whereby group members did not know they were going to be interviewed 
together (e.g., Vrij et al., 2012), we expect communication cues to deception to also occur if 
groups know that they will be interviewed together. 
Third, deception studies with individuals have shown that methods to elicit additional 
information, such as requesting someone to report the event in reverse order or using a model 
statement of a detailed answer, encourages truth-tellers more than liars to provide plausible 
additional information (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham & Fisher, 2015; Vrij, 2015; Vrij, et 
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al., in press). Truth-tellers almost never report all they know in an initial free recall so there is 
plenty of opportunity for them to elaborate when methods to elicit additional information are 
implemented (Vrij, Hope & Fisher, 2014). In contrast, liars prepare answers to questions and 
are more likely to report all they have prepared during the initial free recall (e.g., Shaw, Vrij, 
Mann, Leal & Hillman, 2013; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi & Granhag, 2012), and therefore 
cannot elaborate when additional questions are asked. Furthermore, liars may lack the 
imagination to report more details or may be reluctant to report more details through fear that 
they will give away possible leads to investigators (Vrij, 2015; Vrij et al., in press). Someone 
could argue that the techniques encouraging interviewees to say more will be even more 
effective in eliciting cues to deceit in collective interviews than in individual interviews, 
because truth-telling groups could use various shared memory processes (as discussed above) 
to come up with the additional information.   
Conclusion 
The current review demonstrates that collective interviewing, whereby two or more 
people are interviewed together at the same time, has potential for detecting deceit. Studies 
have demonstrated that a collective interviewing approach allows for cues to deceit to emerge 
that cannot emerge when interviewing individuals, e.g., communicative and interactive cues, 
such as posing questions to one another, correcting and interrupting one another, and looking 
at each other. To improve our understanding of the deception occurring within groups and to 
facilitate lie detection in such groups, future studies need to enhance our understanding of 
memory and group dynamic theories in collective interviews and to apply this understanding 
to deception.  
 
 
 
23 
 
References 
Arrow, H., McGrath, J.E., & Berdahl, J.L. (2000). Small groups as complex systems: 
Formation, coordination, development, and adaptation. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Barber, S.J., Harris, C.B., & Rajaram, S. (2014). Why two heads apart are better than two 
heads together: Multiple mechanisms underlie the collaborative inhibition effect in 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 41, 
559-566. DOI: 10.1037/xlm0000037. 
Barnier, A.J., & Sutton, J. (2008). From individual to collective memory: Theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. Memory, 16, 177-182. DOI: 10.1080/09541440701828274. 
Bartlett, F.C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Basden, B.H., Basden, D.R., Bryner, S., & Thomas III, R.L. (1997). A comparison of 
group and individual remembering: Does group participation disrupt retrieval? 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 23, 1176-
1191. DOI: 10.1037/0278-7393.23.5.1176. 
Blumen, H.M., & Stern, Y. (2011). Short-term and long-terms collaboration benefits 
on individual recall in younger and older adults. Memory & Cognition, 39, 147-154. 
DOI: 10.3758/s13421-010-0023-6. 
Bond, C.F., & DePaulo, B.M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgements. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 10, 214-234. DOI: 10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2. 
Chemers, M.M. (2001). Leadership effectiveness: An integrative review. In M.A. 
Hogg & R.S. Tindale (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group 
processes (pp. 376-399). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.  
24 
 
DePaulo, B.M., Lindsay, J. L., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Cooper, H. 
(2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 74-118. DOI: 10.1037/0033-
2909.129.1.74. 
Driskell, J.E., Salas, E., & Driskell, T. (2012). Social indicators of deception. Human Factors: 
The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 54, 577-588. DOI: 
10.1177/0018720812446338. 
Festinger, L. (1950). Informal social communication. Psychological Review, 57, 271- 
282. DOI: 10.1037/h0056932.  
Gabbert, F., Memon, A., & Allan, K. (2003). Memory conformity: Can eyewitnesses 
influence each other’s memories for an event? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 533-
543. DOI: 10.1002/acp.885. 
Gersick, C.J., & Hackman, J.R. (1990). Habitual routines in task performing groups. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 47, 65-97. DOI: 
10.1016/0749-5978(90)90047-D.  
Gilovich, T., Savitsky, K., & Medvec, V.H. (1998). The illusion of transparency: 
Biased assessments of others’ ability to read one’s emotional states. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 332-346. DOI: 10.1016/S0022-
1031(03)00056-8. 
Granhag, P.A., & Hartwig, M. (2015). The Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique: A 
conceptual overview. In P.A. Granhag, A. Vrij, & B. Verchuere (Eds.), Deception 
detection: Current challenges and new approaches. Chichester, England: Wiley.  
Granhag, P.A., & Strömwall, L.A. (1999). Repeated interrogations: Stretching the 
deception detection paradigm. Expert Evidence, 7, 163-174. DOI: 
10.1023/A:1008993326434.  
25 
 
Granhag, P.A., Strömwall, L.A., & Jonsson, A.C. (2003). Partners in crime: How liars in 
collusion betray themselves. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33, 848-868. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1559-1816.2003.tb01928.x. 
Halbwachs, M. (1992). On collective memory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Hartwig, M., Granhag, P.A., & Luke, T. (2014). Strategic use of evidence during investigative 
interviews: The state of the science. In D.C. Raskin, C.R. Honts, & J.C. Kircher (Eds.), 
Credibility Assessment: Scientific Research and Applications (pp. 1-36). Academic 
Press. 
Hintz, V.B. (1990). Cognitive and consensus processes in group recognition memory 
performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 705-718. DOI: 
10.1037/0022-3514.59.4.705. 
Hirst, W., & Rajaram, S. (2014). Towards a social turn in memory: An introduction to a 
special issue on social memory. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and 
Cognition, 3, 239-243. DOI: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.10.001 
Hodgson, B., & Costello, A. (2006). The prognostic significance of burglary in company. 
European Journal of Criminology, 3, 115-119. DOI: 10.1177/1477370806059083. 
Hofstede, G.H. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International differences in work 
related values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Hofstede, G.H. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviours, 
institutions and organizations across nations. Thousands Oak, CA: Sage. 
Hollander, E.P. (1985). Leadership and power. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), 
Handbook of social psychology (3rd Ed., Vol. 2, pp. 485-537). New York: Random 
House.  
Hollingshead, A.B. (1998). Retrieval processes in transactive memory systems. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 659-671. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.659. 
26 
 
Hollingshead, A.B., & Brandon, D.P. (2003). Potential benefits of communication in 
transactive memory systems. Human Communication Research, 29, 607-615. 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2958.2003.tb00859.x. 
Home Office. (2013). Sham marriages and civil partnerships: Background information and 
proposed referral and investigation scheme. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/256257/
Sham_Marriage_and_Civil_Partnerships.pdf. 
Hui, C.H. (1988). Measurement of individualism–collectivism. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 22, 17-36. DOI: 10.1016/0092-6566(88)90022-0. 
Jundi, S., Vrij, A., Hope, L., Mann, S., & Hillman, J. (2013). Establishing evidence through 
undercover and collective intelligence interviewing. Psychology, Public Policy, and 
Law, 19, 297-306. DOI: 10.1037/a0033571. 
Jundi, S., Vrij, A., Mann, S., Hope, L., Hillman, J., Warmelink, L., & Gahr, E. (2013). Who 
should I look at? Eye contact during collective interviewing as a cue to deceit. 
Psychology, Crime & Law, 19, 661-671. DOI: 10.1080/1068316X.2013.793332. 
Kassin, S.M., & Gudjonsson, G.H. (2004). The psychology of confessions: A review of the 
literature and issues. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 5, 33-44. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1529-1006.2004.00016.x. 
Leal, S., Vrij, A., Warmelink, L., Vernham, Z., & Fisher, R. (2015). You cannot hide your 
telephone lies: Providing a model statement as an aid to detect deception in insurance 
telephone calls. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 20, 129-146. 
DOI: 10.1111/lcrp.12017. 
Loftus, E.F. (2005). Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year 
investigation of the malleability of memory. Learning and Memory, 12, 361-366. 
DOI: 10.1101/lm.94705. 
27 
 
McGloin, J.M., & Piquero, A.R. (2009). ‘I wasn’t alone’: Collective behaviour and violent 
delinquency. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 42, 336-353. DOI: 
10.1375/acri.42.3.336. 
Nahari, G., & Vrij, A. (2014). Can I borrow your alibi? The applicability of the 
verifiability approach to the case of an alibi witness. Journal of Applied Research in 
Memory and Cognition, 3, 89-94. DOI: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.04.005. 
Nahari, G., Vrij, A., & Fisher, R.P. (2014). Exploiting liars’ verbal strategies by examining 
the verifiability of details. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 19, 227-239. DOI: 
10.1111/j.2044-8333.2012.02069.x. 
Pociask, S., & Rajaram, S. (2014). The effects of collaborative practice on statistical 
problem solving: Benefits and boundaries. Journal of Applied Research in Memory 
and Cognition, 3, 252-260. DOI: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.06.005. 
Rajaram, S. (2011). Collaboration both hurts and helps memory: A cognitive 
perspective. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 000, 1-6. DOI: 
10.1177/0963721411403251. 
Rogers-Millar, E.L., & Millar, F.E. (1979). Domineeringness and dominance: A 
transactional view. Human Communication Research, 5, 238-246. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1468-2958.1979.tb00637.x. 
Ross, M., Blatz, C.W., & Schryer, E. (2008). Social memory processes. In H.L. 
Roediger (Eds.), Learning and memory – A comprehensive reference, Vol. 2: 
Cognitive psychology of learning (pp. 911-926). New York, NY: Elsevier.  
Shaw, D.J., Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., & Hillman, J. (2013). Expect the unexpected? 
Variations in question type elicit cues to deception in joint interviewer 
contexts. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 27, 336-343. DOI: 10.1002/acp.2911. 
 
28 
 
Soufan, A.H. (2011). The black banners: The inside story of 9/11 and the war against al-
Qaeda. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Sporer, S.L., & Schwandt, B. (2006). Paraverbal indicators of deception: A meta-analytic 
synthesis. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 421-446. DOI: 10.1002/acp.1190. 
Strömwall, L.A., Granhag, P.A., & Jonsson, A.C. (2003). Deception among pairs: “Let’s say 
we had lunch and hope they will swallow it!” Psychology, Crime & Law, 9, 109-124. 
DOI: 10.1080/1068316031000116238. 
Van Mastrigt, S.B., & Farrington, D.P. (2009). Co-offending, age, gender and crime type: 
Implications for criminal justice policy. British Journal of Criminology, 49, 552-573. 
DOI: 10.1093/bjc/azp021. 
Vernham, Z., Vrij, A., Leal, S., Mann, S., & Hillman, J. (2014). Collective 
interviewing: A transactive memory approach towards identifying signs of 
truthfulness. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 3, 12-20. DOI: 
10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.01.001. 
Vernham, Z., Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., & Hillman, J. (2014). Collective 
interviewing: Eliciting cues to deceit using a turn-taking approach. Psychology, Public 
Policy and Law, 20, 309-324. DOI: 10.1037/law0000015. 
Verschuere, B., Ben-Shakhar, G., & Meijer, E. (2011). Memory detection: Theory and 
application of the concealed information test. Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Vrij, A. (2008a). Detecting lies and deceit: Pitfalls and opportunities (2nd Ed.). 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.  
Vrij, A. (2008b). Nonverbal dominance versus verbal accuracy in lie detection: A plea to 
change police practice. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 35, 1323-1336. 
29 
 
Vrij, A. (2015). A cognitive approach to lie detection. In P.A. Granhag, A. Vrij, & B. 
Verchuere (Eds.), Deception detection: Current challenges and new approaches. 
Chichester, England: Wiley. 
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., Blank, H., Leal, S., & Mann, S. (in press). A cognitive approach to elicit 
nonverbal and verbal cues of deceit. In J.W. van Prooijen & P.A.M. van Lange (Eds.), 
Cheating, corruption, and concealment: The roots of dishonest behavior. Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press.  
Vrij, A., Fisher, R., Mann, S., & Leal, S. (2006). Detecting deception by manipulating 
cognitive load. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 141–142. 
DOI:10.1016/j.tics.2006.02.003. 
Vrij, A., & Granhag, P.A. (2012). Eliciting cues to deception and truth: What matters are the 
questions asked. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 1, 110-117. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2012.02.004. 
Vrij, A., Granhag, P.A., & Porter, S. (2010). Pitfalls and opportunities in nonverbal and verbal 
lie detection. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 11, 89-121. DOI: 
10.1177/1529100610390861. 
Vrij, A., Granhag, P.A., Mann, S., & Leal, S. (2011). Outsmarting the liars: Toward a 
cognitive lie detection approach. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 28-
32. DOI: 10.1177/0963721410391245. 
Vrij, A., Hope, L., & Fisher, R.P. (2014). Eliciting reliable information in investigative 
interviews. Policy Insights from Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 129-136. DOI: 
10.1177/2372732214548592. 
 
 
30 
 
Vrij, A., Jundi, S., Hope, L., Hillman, J., Gahr, E., Leal, S., Warmelink, L., Mann, S., 
Vernham, Z., & Granhag, P.A. (2012). Collective interviewing of suspects. Journal of 
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 1, 41-44. DOI: 
10.1016/j.jarmac.2011.12.002. 
Vrij, A., Leal, S., Granhag, P.A., Mann, S., Fisher, R.P., Hillman, J., & Sperry, K. (2009). 
Outsmarting the liars: The benefit of asking unanticipated questions. Law and Human 
Behavior, 33, 159-166. DOI: 10.1007/s10979-008-9143-y. 
Vrij, A., Leal, S., Mann, S., Vernham, Z., & Brankaert, F. (2015). Translating theory into 
practice: Evaluating a cognitive lie detection training workshop. Journal of Applied 
Research in Memory and Cognition. DOI:10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.02.002. 
Vrij, A., Mann., S, Fisher, R.P., Leal., S., Milne, R., & Bull., R. (2008). Increasing cognitive 
load to facilitate lie detection: The benefit of recalling an event in reverse order.  Law 
and Human Behavior, 32, 253-265. DOI 10.1007/s10979-007-9103-y.  
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal., S., & Granhag, P.A. (2010). Getting into the minds of pairs of liars 
and truth-tellers: An examination of their strategies. The Open Criminology Journal, 3, 
17-22. DOI: 10.2174/1874917801003010017. 
Walczyk, J.J., Igou, F.P., Dixon, A.P., & Tcholakian, T. (2013). Advancing lie detection by 
inducing cognitive load on liars: A review of relevant theories and techniques guided by 
lessons from polygraph-based approaches. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 14. DOI: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00014. 
Warmelink, L., Vrij, A., Mann, S., Jundi, S., & Granhag, P. A. (2012). Have you been there 
before? The effect of experience and question expectedness on lying about 
intentions. Acta Psychologica, 141, 178-183. DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.07.011.  
31 
 
Wegner, D.M. (1987). Transactive memory: A contemporary analysis of the group mind. In 
B. Mullen & G. R. Goethals (Eds.), Theories of group behaviour (pp. 185-208). New 
York: Springer-Verlag. 
Wegner, D.M., Erber, R., & Raymond, P. (1991). Transactive memory in close relationships. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 923-929.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~wegner/pdfs/Wegner,Erber,&Raymond1991.pdf. 
Wegner, D.M., Giuliano, T., & Hertel, P.T. (1985). Cognitive interdependence in 
close relationships. In W.J. Ickes (Eds.), Compatible and Incompatible Relationships 
(pp. 253-276). New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Weldon, M.S., & Bellinger, K.D. (1997). Collective memory: collaborative and individual 
processes in remembering. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory 
and Cognition, 23, 1160-75. DOI: 10.1037//0278-7393.23.5.1160. 
 32 
 
Table 1 
Overview of the collective interviewing studies completed so far and the deception cues measured when pairs are interviewed together at the 
same time. 
Collective interviewing study 
Deception cue 
 
Context of study 
Truth-tellers  
Mean (SD)  
Liars 
Mean (SD)  
F p d 
Driskell, Salas & Driskell (2012) 
Mutual eye gaze 
Verbal transitions 
Posing questions 
First person plural usage 
Use of words related to social processes 
Assent words 
Vrij et al. (2012) 
Interruptions 
Corrections 
Additional information  
Brief investigative 
interview 
 
 
 
 
 
Time-consuming police-
style interview 
 
9.88 (8.70) 
7.19 (4.79) 
.64 (.65) 
3.52 (1.94) 
12.51 (4.90) 
.77 (.63) 
 
8.57 (8.45) 
1.48 (1.75) 
30.86 (13.80) 
 
3.77 (3.75) 
.84 (1.01) 
.25 (.36) 
3.18 (1.91) 
10.20 (2.12) 
.27 (.41) 
 
2.73 (2.96) 
.14 (.35) 
18.32 (12.70) 
 
5.39 
28.09 
10.91 
.44 
2.96 
11.05 
 
9.34 
12.39  
9.63 
 
.029* 
<.001**** 
.003*** 
.513 
.098 
.003*** 
 
.004*** 
.001*** 
.003*** 
 
.91 
.80 
.74 
.18 
.61 
.94 
 
.92 
1.06 
.95 
Jundi, Vrij, Mann, et al. (2013) 
Looking at each other 
Looking at the interviewer   
 
Time-consuming police-
style interview 
 
 
 
3.74 (1.57) 
4.26 (1.18) 
 
 
3.00 (1.41) 
5.18 (1.10) 
 
 
4.11 
6.61 
 
 
.049* 
.014* 
 
 
.62 
.77 
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Jundi, Vrij, Hope, Mann & Hillman (2013) 
Posing questions when completing task 
Vernham, Vrij, Mann, Leal & Hillman (2014) 
Number of swaps 
Continuations per swap 
Repetitions per swap 
Waiting per swap 
Intelligence timeline task 
 
Immigration interview 
 
 
 
10.68 (5.97) 
 
8.83 (8.00)  
.70 (.35) 
.13 (.14) 
.33 (.27) 
 
5.48 (4.00) 
 
9.05 (5.78) 
.43 (.19) 
.52 (.21) 
.71 (.24) 
 
12.22 
 
.010 
10.419 
56.945 
24.818 
 
.001*** 
 
.919 
.002*** 
<.001**** 
<.001**** 
 
1.04 
 
.03 
.96 
2.19 
1.49 
Vernham, Vrij, Leal, Mann & Hillman (2014) 
Posing questions to one another 
Providing cues to one another 
Handing over remembering responsibility 
Finishing each other’s sentences 
Nahari & Vrij (2014) 
Verifiable details (prove pair together) 
Immigration interview 
 
 
 
 
Alibi witness scenario 
 
15.83 (10.62) 
3.79 (2.87) 
.63 (.97) 
5.92 (2.95) 
 
39.14 (14.53) 
 
9.41 (5.80) 
.91 (1.66) 
.05 (.21) 
1.14 (1.46) 
 
13.06 (10.96) 
 
6.319 
16.937 
7.513 
47.217 
 
51.31 
 
.016* 
<.001**** 
.009** 
<.001**** 
 
<.001**** 
 
.75 
1.23 
.83 
2.05 
 
2.03 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .005; ****p < .001 
 
